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Human enhancement—our ability to use technology to enhance our bodies and minds, as 
opposed to its application for therapeutic purposes—is a critical issue facing nanotechnology. It 
will be involved in some of the near-term applications of nanotechnology, with such research 
labs as MIT’s Institute for Soldier Technologies working on exoskeletons and other innovations 
that increase human strength and capabilities. It is also a core issue related to far-term predictions 
in nanotechnology, such as longevity, nanomedicine, artificial intelligence and other issues. 
The implications of nanotechnology as related to human enhancement are perhaps some of 
the most personal and therefore passionate issues in the emerging field of nanoethics, forcing us 
to rethink what it means to be human or, essentially, our own identity. For some, nanotech-
nology holds the promise of making us superhuman; for others, it offers a darker path toward 
becoming Frankenstein’s monster. 
Without advocating any particular side of the debate, this essay will look at a growing 
chorus of calls for human enhancement, especially in the context of emerging technologies, to 
be embraced and unrestricted. We will critically examine recent “pro-enhancement” arguments 
—articulated in More Than Human (2005) by Ramez Naam,1 as one of the most visible works on the 
subject today—and conclude that they ultimately need to be repaired, if they are to be convincing. 
I 
Before we proceed, we should lay out a few actual and possible scenarios in order to be 
clear on what we mean by “human enhancement.” In addition to steroid use to become stronger 
and plastic surgery to become more attractive, people today also use drugs to boost creativity, 
attentiveness, perception, and more. In the future, nanotechnology might give us implants that 
* E-mail: patrick@nanoethics.org; fritz@nanoethics.org.
 
1 Ramez Naam, More Than Human (Broadway Books, New York: 2005).  See also www.morethanhuman.org.
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enable us to see in the dark, or in currently non-visible regions such as the infrared. As artificial 
intelligence advances, nano-computers might be imbedded into our bodies in order to help process 
more information faster, even to the point where man and machine become indistinguishable. 
These scenarios admittedly sound like science fiction, but with nanotechnology, we move 
much closer to turning them into reality. Atomically-precise manufacturing techniques continue 
to become more refined and will be able to build cellular-level sensors and other tools that can 
be integrated into our bodies. Indeed, designs have already been worked out for such 
innovations as a ‘respirocyte’—an artificial red blood cell that holds a reservoir of oxygen.2 A 
respirocyte would come in handy for, say, a heart attack victim to continue breathing for an 
extra hour until medical treatment is available, despite a lack of blood circulation to the lungs or 
anywhere else. But in an otherwise-healthy athlete, a respirocyte could boost performance by 
delivering extra oxygen to the muscles, as if the person were breathing from a pure oxygen tank. 
What we do not mean by ‘human enhancement’ is the mere use of tools, such as a hammer 
or Microsoft Word, to aid human activities, or ‘natural’ improvements of diet and exercise— 
though, as we shall discuss later, agreeing on a definition may not be a simple matter. Further, 
we must distinguish the concept from therapeutic applications, such as using steroids to treat 
any number of medical conditions, which we take to be unobjectionable for the purposes of 
this essay. 
Also, our discussion here can benefit from quickly noting some of the intuitions on both 
sides of the debate. The anti-enhancement camp may point to steroids in sports as an argument 
for regulating technology: that it corrupts the notion of fair competition. Also, some say, by 
condoning enhancement we are setting the wrong example for our children, encouraging risky 
behavior in bodies that are still developing. ‘Human dignity’ is also a recurring theme for this 
side, believing that such enhancements pervert the notion of what it means to be human (with all 
our flaws). 
On the pro-enhancement side, it seems obvious that the desire for self-improvement is 
morally laudable. Attempts to improve ourselves through, for example, education, hard work, 
and so on are uncontroversially good; why should technology-based enhancements be viewed 
any differently? In addition to virtue-based defenses of technological enhancement, we might 
also appeal to individual autonomy to defend the practice: so long as rational, autonomous 
individuals freely choose to participate in these projects, intervention against them is morally 
problematic. 
In More Than Human, it is interesting to see that the debate is framed as a conservative 
(anti-enhancement) versus liberal (pro-enhancement) issue.3 This proposed dichotomy is 
undoubtedly influenced by the creation and work of the U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics. 
Led by Leon Kass, M.D., PhD, the council released a report, Beyond Therapy, in 2004 that 
endorsed an anti-enhancement position; this report has become the prime target for both liberals 
and pro-enhancement groups. However, it would be a mistake to think that the issue necessarily 
follows political lines, since there may be good reason for a liberal to be anti-enhancement, as 
well as for a conservative to support it. 
2 Robert A. Freitas Jr., “Exploratory Design in Medical Nanotechnology: A Mechanical Artificial Red
Cell,” Artificial Cells, Blood Substitutes, and Immobil. Biotech. 26 (1998): 411–430. 
3 Naam (2005), p. 3–5. 
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II 
In his introductory chapter, Naam outlines the overarching theme that is supported by his 
research and analysis in subsequent chapters. He offers four distinct arguments in defending the 
pro-enhancement position: first, there are pragmatic reasons for embracing enhancement; 
second, regulation will not work anyway; third, respect for our autonomy licenses the practices; 
and, fourth, that the desire to enhance is inherently human and therefore must be respected. 
1. In his first argument, Naam points out that “scientists cannot draw a clear line between 
healing and enhancing.”4 The implied conclusion here is that, if no principled distinction can be 
made between two concepts, it is irrational to afford them different moral status. So, since there 
are no restrictions on therapy, in that we have a right to medical aid, there also should be no 
restrictions on human enhancement, i.e. using the same medical devices or procedures to 
improve our already-healthy bodies. In other words, there is no significant or moral difference 
between therapy and enhancement. 
There are numerous problems with such a claim; we will herein elucidate two. The first 
problem can be illustrated by the famous philosophical puzzle called “The Paradox of the 
Heap”: given a heap of sand with N number of grains of sand, if we remove one grain of sand, 
we are still left with a heap of sand (that now only has N–1 grains of sand). If we remove one 
more grain, we are again left with a heap of sand (that now has N–2 grains). If we extend this 
line of reasoning and continue to remove grains of sand, we see that there is no clear point where 
we can definitely say that on side A, here is a heap of sand, but on the side B, this is less than a 
heap. In other words, there is no clear distinction between a heap of sand and a less-than-a-heap 
or even no sand at all. However, the wrong conclusion to draw here is that there is no difference 
between them; so likewise, it would be fallacious to conclude that there is no difference between 
therapy and enhancement. It may still be the case that there is no moral difference between the 
two, but we cannot arrive at it through the argument that there is no clear defining line. 
But, second, there likely are principled distinctions that can be made between enhancement 
and therapy.5 For example, Norm Daniels has argued for the use of “quasi-statistical concepts of 
‘normality’ to argue that any intervention designed to restore or preserve a species-typical level 
of functioning for an individual should count as [therapy]”6 and the rest as enhancement. 
Alternatively, Eric Juengst has proposed that therapies aim at pathologies that compromise 
health, whereas enhancements aim at improvements that are not health-related.7 
Another pragmatic reason Naam gives is that “we cannot stop research into enhancing 
ourselves without also halting research focused on healing the sick and injured.”8 However, this 
claim seems to miss the point: anti-enhancement advocates can simply counter that it is not the 
research they want stopped or regulated, but rather the use of that research or its products for 
4 Naam (2005), p. 5.

5 For more discussion of these ideas, see Fritz Allhoff, “Germ-Line Genetic Enhancement and
 
Rawlsian Primary Goods,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journals 15.1 (2005): 43–60.
6 Norm Daniels, “Growth Hormone Therapy for Short Stature: Can We Support the Treatment/ 
Enhancement Distinction?”, Growth:  Genetics & Hormones 8.S1 1992): 46–8.
7 Eric Juengst, “Can Enhancement Be Distinguished from Prevention in Genetic Medicine?”, Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 125–42.
8 Naam (2005), p. 5. 
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enhancement. For instance, we may want to ban steroids from sports, but no one is calling for an 
outright ban on all steroids research, much of which serves healing purposes. 
Naam also puts the burden of proof—that regulation of enhancement is needed—on the 
anti-enhancement side, instead of offering an argument that enhancement need not be 
regulated.9 But it is unclear here why we should abandon the principle of erring on the side of 
caution, particularly where human health may be at stake as well as other societal impacts. 
Further, both sides have already identified a list of benefits or harms that might arise from 
unregulated human enhancement. The problem now is to evaluate these benefits and harms 
against each other (e.g., increased longevity versus overpopulation), also factoring in any 
relevant human rights. If neither side is able to convincingly show that benefits outweigh harms, 
or vice versa, then burden of proof seems to be a non-issue. 
2. In his second argument, Naam compares a ban on enhancement to the U.S. “War on 
Drugs”, citing its ineffectiveness as well as externalities such as artificially high prices and 
increased safety risks (e.g., users having to share needles because they cannot obtain new or 
clean ones) for those who will use drugs anyway.10 If people are as avidly driven to 
enhancement as they are to drugs, then yes, this may be the case. But is that a good enough 
reason to not even try to contain a problem, whether it is drugs, prostitution, gambling, or 
whatever? While such laws may be paternalistic, they reflect the majority consensus that a 
significant number of people cannot act responsibly in these activities and need to be protected 
from themselves and from inevitably harming others. Even many liberals are not categorically 
opposed to these regulations and may see the rationale of ‘greater good’ behind similar 
regulation of enhancement. 
Further, that we are unable to totally stop an activity does not seem to be reason at all 
against prohibiting that activity. If it were, then we would not have any laws against murder, 
speeding, ‘illegal’ immigration—in fact, it is unclear what laws we would have left. Laws exist 
precisely because some people inescapably have tendencies to the opposite of what is desired 
by society or government. Again, this is not to say that human enhancement should be 
prohibited, only that a stronger and more compelling argument is needed. 
3. In his third argument, Naam ties human enhancement to the debate over human freedom: 
“Should individuals and families have the right to alter their own minds and bodies, or should 
that power be held by the state? In a democratic society, it’s every man and woman who should 
determine such things, not the state...Governments are instituted to secure individual rights, not 
to restrict them.”11 
Besides politicizing a debate that need not be political, Naam’s arguments are increasingly 
not anti-conservative but pro-libertarian. You would need to have already adopted the 
libertarian philosophy to accept this line of reasoning (as well as the preceding argument), since 
again, even liberals can see that the state has a broader role in creating a functioning, orderly 
society. This necessarily entails reasonable limits to whatever natural rights we have and also 
implies new responsibilities—for example, we shouldn’t exercise our right to free speech by 
slandering or by yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater. 
9 Naam (2005), p. 5.
10 Naam (2005), p. 6.
11 Naam (2005), p. 6–9. 
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A democratic society is not compelled to endorse laissez-faire political philosophy and the 
minimal state, as some political philosophers have suggested.12 Nor would reasonable people 
necessarily want unrestricted freedom, e.g. no restrictions or background checks for gun 
ownership. Even in a democracy as liberal as ours the United States we understand the value of 
regulations as a way to enhance our freedom. For instance, our economic system is not truly a 
“free market”—though we advocate freedom in general, regulations exist not only to protect 
our rights, but also to create an orderly process that greases the economic wheel, accelerating 
both innovations and transactions. As a simpler example, by disciplining a dog to obey 
commands and not run around unchecked, we actually increase that pet’s freedom by now being 
able to take it on more walks and perhaps without a leash (not to compare people with dogs or 
laws with behavioral conditioning). 
4. Finally, Naam argues that people have been enhancing themselves from the start: “Far 
from being unnatural, the drive to alter and improve on ourselves is a fundamental part of who 
we humans are. As a species we’ve always looked for ways to be faster, stronger, and smarter 
and to live longer.”13 This seems to be an accurate observation, but it is an argumentative leap 
from this fact about the world, which is descriptive, to a moral conclusion about the world, 
which is normative. Or, as the philosophical saying goes, we cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’, 
meaning just because something is a certain way doesn’t mean it should be that way or must 
continue to be that way. For instance, would the fact that we have engaged in wars—or slavery, 
or intolerance—across the entire history of civilization imply that we should continue with 
those activities? 
More seriously, this argument seems to turn on an overly-broad definition of ‘human 
enhancement’, such that it includes the use of tools, diet, exercise, and so on—or what we 
would intuitively call ‘natural’ improvement. An objection to Naam’s first argument also 
applies here: just because we cannot clearly delineate between enhancement and therapy or 
tool-use does not mean there is no line between them. We understand that steroid use by 
baseball players is a case of human enhancement; we also understand that using a rock to crack 
open a clam is not. Still, the fact that we have not arrived at a clear definition of ‘human 
enhancement’ should not prevent us from using intuitive distinctions to meaningfully discuss 
the issue. 
III 
The point here is not that human enhancement should be restricted. It is simply that current 
arguments need to be more compelling and philosophically rigorous, if the pro-enhancement 
side is to be successful. There is admittedly a strong intuition driving the pro-enhancement 
movement, but it needs to be articulated more fully, resulting in an argument something like the 
following: 
Who we are now seems to be a product of nature and nurture, most of which is beyond our 
control. So, if this genetic-environmental lottery is truly random, then why should we be 
constrained to its results? After all, we’ve never agreed to such a process in the first place. Why 
12 See, for example, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York:  Basic Books 1974).
13 Naam (2005), p. 9. 
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not enhance ourselves to be on par with the capabilities of others? And if that is morally 
permissible, then why not go a little—or a lot—beyond the capabilities of others? 
As suggested in the above analysis, one of the first steps in discussing human enhancement 
is to arrive at a better definition of what it is, perhaps by adopting that used by Daniels or 
Juengst, though these are still tough issues. For instance, does it matter whether enhancements 
are worn outside our bodies as opposed to being implanted? Why should carrying around a 
Pocket PC or binoculars be acceptable, but having a computer or a ‘bionic eye’ implanted in our 
bodies be subject to possible regulation—what is the moral difference between the two? 
Further, there are societal and ethical implications that also need to be considered, apart 
from those already mentioned. Before we too quickly dismiss the idea of ‘human dignity’ as 
romanticized and outdated, we need to give it full consideration and ask whether that concept 
would suffer if human enhancement were unrestricted. Is there an obligation to enhance our 
children, or will parents feel pressure to do so? Might there be an ‘Enhancement Divide’, 
similar to the Digital Divide, that significantly disadvantages those without? If some people can 
interact with the world in ways that are unimaginable to others (such as echolocation or seeing 
in the infrared), will that create a further ‘Communication Divide’ such that people no longer 
share the same basic experiences in order to communicate with each other? 
In this essay, we have tried to detail some of the challenges that nanotechnology and 
nanoethics will confront as applications to human enhancement become technologically viable. 
This will not be in the distant future, but rather sooner than many of us might have expected. It 
seems to the authors that a balanced and reasonable perspective is more appropriate than either 
polarizing extreme, if we are to responsibly and productively advance nanotechnology and its 
applications, particularly in light of the challenges to the pro-enhancement position that we 
have described. 
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